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STATEMENT REGARDING CONSENT TO FILE 
 
 Both parties have consented to the filing of Constitutional Accoun-
tability Center’s brief amicus curiae. 
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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
 
Pursuant to Rule 26.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
amicus states that it is not a publicly-held corporation, does not issue 
stock and does not have a parent corporation.  Amicus Constitutional 
Accountability Center is a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization. 
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INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE 
The Constitutional Accountability Center (CAC) is a think tank, 
public interest law firm, and action center dedicated to fulfilling the 
progressive promise of our Constitution’s text and history.  CAC works 
in our courts, through our government, and with legal scholars and the 
public to improve understanding of the Constitution and to preserve the 
rights, freedoms, and structural safeguards that our charter guaran-
tees.   
Constitutional Accountability Center has written extensively on 
the constitutional basis for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act1 and has submitted testimony to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee regarding the constitutionality of the Act under Congress’s Com-
                                                          
1  See, e.g., Elizabeth B. Wydra, The States, Health Care Reform and the 
Constitution, available at http://www.theusconstitution.org/ 
upoad/fck/file/File_storage/The%20States,%20Health%20Care%20Refor
m,%20and%20the%20Constitution%281%29.pdf?phpMyAdmin=TzXZ9I
zqiNgbGqj5tqLH06F5Bxe; Elizabeth B. Wydra, Strange Brew: The Tea 
Party’s Errant Constitutional Attacks on Health Care Reform, available 
at http://theusconstitution.org/blog.history/?p=1829; Iowa Sen. Jack 
Hatch & Elizabeth B. Wydra, Dismiss the Florida Lawsuit: Health Care 
Reform Law Preserves Constitutional Federalism, available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/elizabeth-b-wydra/dismiss-the-florida-
lawsu_b_614846.html. 
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merce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause powers.2  CAC also 
represents a bipartisan group of state legislators from across the coun-
try in Florida, et al. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, et al.3  
This brief draws heavily on the University of Virginia’s landmark 
project, The Papers of George Washington.  The researchers involved in 
this massive project in historical scholarship have worked for decades to 
produce the largest available collection of correspondence to and from 
George Washington and to make digitized copies of these documents 
available to the public, greatly improving our understanding of the 
views of Washington and other important Founders on critical topics 
such as the constitutional powers of the federal government.    
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 The lower court’s vision of a federal government without the pow-
er to address a national problem such as the health care crisis has no 
basis whatsoever in the Constitution’s text and history.  The Father of 
our Nation, George Washington, and the other delegates to the Consti-
                                                          
2 http://theusconstitution.org/blog.history/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/ 
Testimony-for-SJC-Hearing-on-ACA.pdf. 
3 The brief CAC filed on behalf of this group of legislators is available at 
http://www.theusconstitution.org/blog.history/wpcontent/uploads/ 
2010/11/State-Legislators-Amicus-Brief.pdf. 
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tutional Convention shared a conviction that the Constitution must es-
tablish a national government of substantial power.  In considering how 
to grant such power to the national government, the delegates adopted 
Resolution VI, which declared that Congress should have authority “to 
legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of the Union, and also in 
those to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the 
Harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the Exercise of in-
dividual legislation.”  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787 at 131-32 (Max Farrand, ed., rev. ed. 1966). 
 Tasked with translating the principle of Resolution VI into specific 
provisions, the Committee of Detail drafted Article I to grant Congress 
the broad power to, among other things, “regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tri-
bes.”  U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.  While the concept of “commerce” in 
this Clause has always referred to economic activity or trade, the origi-
nal meaning of “commerce” in the Constitution carried “a broader mean-
ing referring to all forms of intercourse in the affairs of life, whether or 
not narrowly economic or mediated by explicit markets.”  AKHIL REED 
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 107 (2005).  As Chief 
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Justice John Marshall explained, “Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, 
but it is something more: it is intercourse.”  Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 
(9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824).  Thus, the lower court’s vision of a Commerce 
Clause power strictly curtailed by tests of self-initiated activity and 
economic subject matter cannot be squared with the Clause’s original 
meaning.  Congress’s regulation of the decision not to buy health insur-
ance under the Commerce Clause is plainly constitutional. 
 The lower court’s interpretation of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause is similarly unsupported by constitutional text and history.  Far 
from the cramped vision of the Clause used by the court below, which 
would permit Congress to regulate only by using means that are them-
selves covered by the Commerce Clause (effectively rendering the Ne-
cessary and Proper Clause a nullity), the grant of power to “make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution” 
constitutionally granted powers was intended to be sweeping.  U.S. 
CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 18.  As Alexander Hamilton explained to President 
Washington, “[t]he means by which national exigencies are to be pro-
vided for, national inconveniences obviated, national prosperity pro-
moted, are of such infinite variety, extent and complexity, that there 
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must of necessity be great latitude of discretion in the selection and ap-
plication of those means.”  THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON DIGITAL 
EDITION (Theodore J. Crackel, ed. 2008) (Letter from Alexander Hamil-
ton to George Washington, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to 
Establish a Bank, 1791).  As recognized by our first President, the rest 
of the Framers, and the Supreme Court from the Founding to the 
present, the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the power to 
use means outside the enumerated list of Article I powers to achieve the 
ends contemplated in the Constitution.   
 Under a faithful reading of the Constitution, the minimum cover-
age provision of the Affordable Care Act is a valid exercise of Congress’s 
Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause powers.  If the 
Court finds that the Commonwealth has standing to challenge the min-
imum coverage provision, the ruling below should be reversed on the 
merits. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The Framers Wrote The Constitution To Give The 
Federal Government Broad Legislative Power To  
Address National Concerns. 
 
Our Constitution was drafted in 1787 “in Order to form a more 
perfect Union”—both more perfect than the British tyranny against 
which the founding generation had revolted and more perfect than the 
flawed Articles of Confederation under which Americans had lived for a 
decade since declaring independence.  The result was a vibrant system 
of federalism that gives broad power to the federal government to act in 
circumstances in which a national approach is necessary or preferable, 
while reserving a significant role for the States to craft innovative poli-
cy solutions reflecting the diversity of America’s people, places, and 
ideas.   
While some have portrayed the Constitution as a document that is 
all about limiting government, particularly during the legal and politi-
cal debate over the constitutionality of health care reform, the historical 
context shows that the Founders were just as, if not more, concerned 
with creating an empowered, effective national government than with 
setting stark limits on federal power.   
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By the time our Founders took up the task of drafting the Consti-
tution in 1787, they had lived for nearly a decade under the dysfunc-
tional Articles of Confederation.  The Articles of Confederation, adopted 
by the Second Continental Congress in 1777 and ratified in 1781, estab-
lished a confederacy built merely on a “firm league of friendship” be-
tween thirteen independent states.  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 
(1781), art. III.  There was only a single branch of national government, 
the Congress, which was made up of state delegations.  ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION, art. V.  Congress under the Articles of Confederation 
had some powers, but was given no means to execute those powers.  
Congress could not directly tax individuals or legislate upon them; it 
had no express power to make laws that would be binding in the states’ 
courts and no general power to establish national courts, and it could 
raise money only by making requests to the states.   
This created such an ineffectual central government that, accord-
ing to George Washington, it nearly cost Americans victory in the Revo-
lutionary War.  In the midst of several American setbacks during the 
war, Washington lamented that, “unless Congress speaks with a more 
decisive tone; unless they are vested with powers by the several States 
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competent to the great purposes of War . . . our Cause is lost.”  18 THE 
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 453 (John C. Fitzpatrick, ed. 1931) 
(Letter to Joseph Jones, May 31, 1780).  See also WASHINGTON: WRIT-
INGS 393 (John Rhodehamel, ed. 1997) (Circular to State Governments, 
Oct. 18, 1780).  Washington believed that the inability of the central 
government to address common concerns such as the maintenance of an 
army could bring disaster: “The sufferings of a complaining army, on 
the one hand, and the inability of Congress and tardiness of the States 
on the other, are the forebodings of evil.”  Id. at 488 (Letter to Alexan-
der Hamilton, March 4, 1783).  
Washington favored strong federal power not just for military 
matters, but also in other general issues of national concern.  Shortly 
after the Revolutionary War was won, Washington wrote to Alexander 
Hamilton stating plainly that “[n]o man in the United States is, or can 
be more deeply impressed with the necessity of a reform in our present 
Confederation than myself.”  Id. at 505 (Letter to Alexander Hamilton, 
March 31, 1783).  Washington explained that, “unless Congress have 
powers competent to all general purposes, that the distresses we have 
encountered, the expences we have incurred, and the blood we have 
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spilt in the course of an Eight years war, will avail us nothing.”  Id. at 
490 (Letter to Alexander Hamilton, March 4, 1783) (emphasis in origi-
nal). 4  See also id. at 519 (Circular to State Governments, June 8, 1783) 
(“[I]t is indispensible to the happiness of the individual States, that 
there should be lodged somewhere, a Supreme Power to regulate and 
govern the general concerns of the Confederated Republic, without 
which the Union cannot be of long duration.”). 
The difficulty Massachusetts had in quelling Shay’s Rebellion in 
1786 further convinced Washington of the great need for improving 
upon the Articles of Confederation: “What stronger evidence can be giv-
en of the want of energy in our governments than these disorders?  If 
there exists not a power to check them, what security has a man of life, 
                                                          
4 Indeed, it is indicative of the shift from revolution to statecraft that 
the Constitution’s first Article gives Congress the power to impose a 
broad range of “Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 1.  “Thus, only a decade after they revolted against imperial tax-
es, Americans were being asked to authorize a sweeping regime of con-
tinental taxes, with the decisive difference that these new taxes would 
be decided on by public servants chosen by the American people them-
selves—taxation with representation.”  AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 107 (2005).  Suggestions that the legiti-
mate complaints of the “Boston Tea Party” in 1775 animated the 
Founders during the Constitutional Convention in 1787 are thus deeply 
flawed.  E.g., Florida et al. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., et 
al., No. 3:10-cv-00091-RV, Order Granting Summary Judgment, Jan. 
31, 2011. 
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liberty, or property?”  4 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: CONFEDE-
RATION SERIES 332 (W.W. Abbot et al., eds. 1992) (Letter to James Mad-
ison, Nov. 5, 1786). 
After the Revolutionary War was won, the Founders turned their 
focus on creating a new, better form of government with a sufficiently 
strong federal power.  The delegates to the Constitutional Convention 
shared Washington’s conviction that the Constitution must establish a 
government of sufficient power.  In considering how to grant such power 
to the national government, the delegates adopted Resolution VI, which 
declared that Congress should have authority “to legislate in all Cases 
for the general Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to which 
the States are separately incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the 
United States may be interrupted by the Exercise of individual legisla-
tion.”  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 131-32 
(Max Farrand, ed., rev. ed. 1966).  See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 108 (2005); Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 8-12 (2010).  The delegates then passed Resolution VI 
on to the Committee of Detail, which was responsible for drafting the 
enumerated powers of Congress in Article I, to transform this general 
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principle into an enumerated list of powers in the Constitution.  Id. at 
10.   
As constitutional scholar Jack Balkin explains, Resolution VI es-
tablished a structural constitutional principle with “its focus on state 
competencies and the general interests of the Union.”  Id.  Translating 
this principle into specific provisions, the Committee of Detail drafted 
Article I to grant Congress the broad power to, among other things, re-
gulate interstate commerce and tax and spend to “provide for the . . . 
general Welfare of the United States.”  U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1.  
These enumerated powers were intended to capture the idea that 
“whatever object of government extends, in its operation or effects, 
beyond the bounds of a particular state, should be considered as belong-
ing to the government of the United States.”  2 THE DEBATES IN THE 
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CON-
STITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADEL-
PHIA 424 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (hereinafter ELLIOT’S DE-
BATES) (Statement of James Wilson). 
The enumeration of powers was not intended to displace the gen-
eral principle of Resolution VI that Congress should have the general 
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ability to legislate in matters of national concern.  As James Wilson, a 
member of the Committee of Detail who was also “America’s leading 
lawyer and one of only six men to have signed both the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution,”5 explained: 
[T]hough this principle be sound and satisfactory, its appli-
cation to particular cases would be accompanied with much 
difficulty, because, in its application, room must be allowed 
for great discretionary latitude of construction of the prin-
ciple.  In order to lessen or remove the difficulty arising from 
discretionary construction on this subject, an enumeration of 
particular instances, in which the application of the principle 
ought to take place, has been attempted with much industry 
and care. 
 
2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 424-25 (emphasis added).  The drafters of the Con-
stitution thus made clear that in each enumerated instance in Article 
I—whether regulating “commerce” or levying taxes—the understanding 
was that Congress would exercise the enumerated power while applying 
the general principle that Congress has power to regulate in cases of 
national concern.6  This list of enumerated powers was not an attempt 
                                                          
5 AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, at 7. 
6  Some scholars have suggested that the Committee of Detail rejected 
Resolution VI or that the Convention repudiated it because the precise 
language of the Resolution was not written into the Constitution.  E.g., 
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMP-
TION OF LIBERTY (2004).  But after the delegates passed Resolution VI, 
Case: 11-1057     Document: 47-1      Date Filed: 03/07/2011      Page: 19
 13 
 
to limit the federal government for its own sake, but rather “[t]he list of 
enumerated powers was designed so that the new federal government 
would have power to pass laws on subjects and concerning problems 
that are federal by nature.”  Balkin, Commerce, at 12.  
II. Focused On More Than Just Trade or Economic 
Transactions, The Framers Included The Commerce 
Clause In The Constitution To Allow The Federal 
Government To Legislate Affairs Among The Several 
States That Require A Federal Response.  
 
The Commerce Clause provides that “Congress shall have Power  
. . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  Given 
that the Committee of Detail drafted the Commerce Clause to manifest 
the principle of Resolution VI that Congress should have power to regu-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the Committee of Detail had no power to reject it, and, as Wilson’s 
comments make clear, the Committee embraced the Resolution’s prin-
ciple and attempted to implement it in Article I.  See Balkin, Commerce, 
at 10-11.  While some today may prefer not to have a government of 
such broad power, a faithful reading of the Constitution’s text and his-
tory, as even conservative scholars have acknowledged, leads to the 
conclusion “that the powers conferred on the national government are 
huge, sweeping, overlapping, and, when taken together, very nearly 
comprehensive.”  Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Government of Adequate 
Powers, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 991, 991-92 (2008).  See also id. at 
992 (noting that even if one believes that, “politically, the full exercise of 
such powers might be unpopular or constitute bad public policy does not 
mean that the Constitution did not, in fact, confer such broad powers”).   
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late matters of national concern, the Commerce Clause’s “text looks the 
way it does because a basic structural principle underlies the text, and 
in fact, the text was written precisely to articulate that general prin-
ciple.”  Balkin, Commerce, at 7.  In other words, “Congress’s power to 
regulate commerce ‘among the several states’ is closely linked to the 
general structural purpose of Congress’s enumerated powers as articu-
lated by the Framers: to give Congress power to legislate in all cases 
where states are separately incompetent or where the interest of the 
nation might be undermined by unilateral or conflicting state action.”  
Id. at 6.   
While commerce has always referred to economic activity or trade, 
the original meaning of “commerce” in the Constitution carried “a 
broader meaning referring to all forms of intercourse in the affairs of 
life, whether or not narrowly economic or mediated by explicit markets.”  
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, at 107.  See also Balkin, Commerce, at 
15-17.  “The concept of ‘commerce’ in the eighteenth century had strong 
social connotations which are almost the opposite of our modern focus 
on commodities.”  Id. at 16.  To demonstrate, constitutional scholar Ak-
hil Amar cites Bolingbroke’s famous mid-eighteenth-century tract, The 
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Idea of a Patriot King, which spoke of the “free and easy commerce of 
social life,” and the Oxford English Dictionary, which referred to “our 
Lord’s commerce with his disciples.”  AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, 
at 107. 
Only if “commerce” is read in light of this broader dictionary defi-
nition and usage does the Commerce Clause effectuate the Framers’ di-
rection that Congress should have authority to “legislate in all Cases for 
the general Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to which the 
States are separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of the 
United States may be interrupted by the Exercise of individual Legisla-
tion.”  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 131-32; 
see supra Section I.  Particularly as related to the Commerce Clause, 
federal issues may generally be described as problems that single states 
cannot solve on their own, either because a matter has spillover effects 
in other states or because there is a collective action problem in which 
states are unwilling or unable to act effectively.  Cf. AMAR, AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION, at 107 (noting that reading interstate and international 
“commerce” broadly in the Commerce Clause fits with “the framers’ 
general goals by enabling Congress to regulate . . . interactions that, if 
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improperly handled by a single state acting on its own, might lead to 
needless wars or otherwise compromise the interests of sister states”).  
Indeed, before the Constitutional Convention, George Washington noted 
the dangers of a lack of federal power to act uniformly in areas of com-
merce, predicting that if states tried to regulate trade, “a many-headed 
monster would be the issue.”  3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: 
CONFEDERATION SERIES 423 (Letter to David Stuart, Nov. 30, 1785). 
As Chief Justice John Marshall observed in Gibbons v. Ogden, if 
commerce were limited merely to active trade of goods, Congress would 
not be able to regulate in areas of keen federal interest, such as naviga-
tion to and from foreign nations.  22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824).  In 
Gibbons, Marshall explained that “[c]ommerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, 
but it is something more: it is intercourse.”  Id.  See generally Balkin, 
Commerce, at 21 (“When people like George Washington, John Mar-
shall, and Joseph Story use the words ‘commerce’ and ‘intercourse’ in-
terchangeably, perhaps we should listen to them.”). 
National power to regulate commerce, broadly defined, was so 
high on the Founders’ agenda that George Washington, on his way to 
his first inauguration as President, stopped to declare to a Delaware 
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crowd that, “The promotion of domestic manufactures will, in my con-
ception, be among the first consequences which may naturally be ex-
pected to flow from an energetic government.”  2 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 78 (W.W. Abbot et al., eds. 1987). 
(“To the Delaware Soc’y for Promoting Domestic Manufacturers,” April 
19-20, 1789).  Washington believed in “a liberal construction of the na-
tional powers,” 7 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL 
SERIES 396, and his Delaware speech indicates that he considered the 
promotion of commerce as an appropriate function of “an energetic gov-
ernment,” 2 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 
78.  
While the meaning of commerce in the Constitution was certainly 
intended to be broad, the text of the Commerce Clause places significant 
limits on federal regulation: Congress can only act if a given problem 
genuinely spills across state or national lines.  As Chief Justice Mar-
shall explained in Gibbons, the Commerce Clause uses the word 
“among” to mean “intermingled with” and that “commerce among the 
States” means “commerce which concerns more States than one.”  22 
U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194.  If commerce within a single state has external 
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effects on other states or on the Nation as a whole then it falls under 
Congress’s constitutional regulatory authority; if commerce is “com-
pletely internal” to a state, then Congress has no power to regulate.  Id. 
at 194.  The “among” requirement of the Commerce Clause thus allows 
Congress to regulate interactions or affairs among the several states, 
including matters “that are mingled among the states or affect more 
than one state, because they cross state borders, because they produce 
collective action problems among the states, or because they involve ac-
tivity in one state that has spillover effects in other states.”  Balkin, 
Commerce, at 23.  See also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).  
In other words, the Commerce Clause contains an important limiting 
principle—but it is derived more from the word “among” than from an 
improperly narrow reading of “commerce.” 
Reading the Commerce Clause with the broad understanding of 
“commerce” as “intercourse,” and the limitation that such “intercourse” 
must be truly federal in nature in that it affects national interests or 
involves a matter that states cannot effectively address on their own, 
connects the text of the Clause to the principle in Resolution VI that 
Case: 11-1057     Document: 47-1      Date Filed: 03/07/2011      Page: 25
 19 
 
animated the drafting of Congress’s enumerated powers in Article I.  As 
Chief Justice Marshall explained in interpreting the Commerce Clause: 
The genius and character of the whole government seem 
to be, that its action is to be applied to all the external 
concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns 
which affect the States generally; but not to those which 
are completely within a particular State, which do not af-
fect other States, and with which it is not necessary to in-
terfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general 
powers of the government. 
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195. 
III. Under The Text And Original Meaning Of The Neces-
sary And Proper Clause, Congress Has Broad Latitude 
To Employ Legislative Means Naturally Related To 
The Lawful Objects Or Ends Of The Federal Govern-
ment.  
 
As discussed above in Sections I and II, the drafters of the Consti-
tution were mindful of Resolution VI’s general principle—that Congress 
should have the ability to respond to matters of national concern—in 
wording the enumerated powers broadly.  In the Federalist Papers, Al-
exander Hamilton exhorted the nation that  
we must bear in mind that we are not to confine our view 
to the present period, but to look forward to remote futur-
ity. . . . Nothing, therefore, can be more fallacious than to 
infer the extent of any power, proper to be lodged in the 
national government from an estimate of its immediate 
necessities.  There ought to be a capacity to provide for 
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future exigencies as they may happen; and as these are 
illimitable in their nature, so it is impossible safely to 
limit that capacity.   
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 34, at 203 (emphasis in original).   
Perhaps nowhere in the Constitution is the goal to provide Con-
gress with discretion to address matters both now and in the future 
more manifest than in the Necessary and Proper Clause.  The Neces-
sary and Proper Clause gives Congress the power “[t]o make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in 
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof.”  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.   As Hamilton explained to Presi-
dent Washington, “[t]he means by which national exigencies are to be 
provided for, national inconveniences obviated, national prosperity 
promoted, are of such infinite variety, extent and complexity, that there 
must of necessity be great latitude of discretion in the selection and ap-
plication of those means.”  THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON DIGITAL 
EDITION (Theodore J. Crackel, ed. 2008) (Letter from Alexander Hamil-
ton to George Washington, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to 
Establish a Bank, 1791). 
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The congressional powers written into the Constitution by the 
Founders are even stronger when coupled with Article I, section 8’s 
sweeping grant of authority to Congress to make laws that are “neces-
sary and proper” for carrying out the other federal powers granted by 
the Constitution.  As Hamilton explained to President Washington, 
“[t]he whole turn of the [Necessary and Proper Clause] indicates that it 
was the intent of the Convention, by that clause, to give a liberal lati-
tude to the exercise of the specified powers.”  Letter from Hamilton to 
Washington, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a 
Bank, 1791.   While the government obviously has no right “to do mere-
ly what it pleases,” Hamilton explained the broad discretion given to 
Congress under the Necessary and Proper Clause as follows:  “If the end 
be clearly comprehended within any of the specified powers, and if the 
measure have an obvious relation to that end, and is not forbidden by 
any particular provision of the constitution; it may safely be deemed to 
come within the compass of the national authority.”  Id. 
President Washington agreed with Hamilton’s exegesis of the con-
stitutional powers of the federal government, approving the bill to es-
tablish a national bank over the objections of other members of his cab-
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inet, including Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, and hailing Hamil-
ton’s vision of federal power.  8 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: 
PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 359 (Letter to David Humphreys, July 20, 1791). 
The Supreme Court, from the Founding-era to the present, has al-
so agreed with Hamilton’s view of federal power under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.  Chief Justice John Marshall explained in McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), that Congress should 
be shown significant deference regarding what laws it considers to be 
appropriate in carrying out its constitutional duties.  In language very 
similar to Hamilton’s, the Court in McCulloch explained, “[l]et the end 
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all 
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, 
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, are constitutional.”  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.  Just last 
Term, the Supreme Court affirmed that so long as Congress does not 
run afoul of any other constitutional provision, the Necessary and Prop-
er Clause affords Congress the power to use any “means that is ration-
ally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated 
power.”  United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010).  As the 
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Supreme Court has long held, “the Necessary and Proper Clause makes 
clear that the Constitution’s grants of specific federal legislative author-
ity are accompanied by broad power to enact laws that are ‘convenient, 
or useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise.’”  Id. at 
1956 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413, 418, 
421). 
To be sure, the powers of the federal government under our Con-
stitution are not unlimited.  As the Tenth Amendment affirms, U.S. 
CONST. amend. X, the Constitution establishes a central government of 
enumerated powers, and the States play a vital role in our federalist 
system.  But the powers our charter does grant to the federal govern-
ment are broad and substantial.7  And, since the Founding, the Ameri-
can people have amended the Constitution to ensure that Congress has 
all the tools it needs to address national problems and protect the con-
stitutional rights of all Americans.  E.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, 
XIV, XV, XVI, XIX.  Through particular enumerated powers, as well as 
                                                          
7 See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, Opinion 
on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank, 1791 (discussing 
“the variety and extent of public exigencies, a far greater proportion of 
which, and of a far more critical kind, are objects of National than of 
State—administration”). 
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through sweeping enforcement clauses such as Article I’s Necessary and 
Proper Clause, the Constitution realizes the Framers’ design for a fed-
eral government able “to legislate in all Cases for the general interests 
of the Union, and also in those to which the States are separately in-
competent, or in which the Harmony of the United States may be inter-
rupted by the Exercise of individual legislation.”  2 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 131-32. 
IV. The Constitution’s Text And History Support The 
Constitutionality Of The Affordable Care Act’s Mini-
mum Coverage Provision. 
 
Congress’s authority to pass legislation to fix problems in the 
health care industry is firmly rooted in Congress’s constitutional power 
to regulate interstate commerce and to enact laws that are necessary 
and proper to exercise that power.8  Since the health care industry com-
prises nearly 20 percent of the U.S. economy, no one can seriously dis-
pute that Congress has the authority to regulate health care and the 
health insurance industries under its Commerce Clause power.  The 
Commonwealth thus aims more narrowly at whether Congress has the 
                                                          
8 This brief focuses on the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause; it does not address other potential sources of constitu-
tional power to enact the Affordable Care Act. 
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power to enact the minimum coverage provision, which generally re-
quires individuals who can afford it to purchase health insurance or pay 
a tax penalty if they refuse to do so.  Through a fundamentally flawed 
reading of the Constitution, the court below held that Congress did not 
have the power to enact the minimum coverage provision. 
A. Commerce Clause 
The Supreme Court has held that Congress has the authority to 
regulate the channels of interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce and persons or things in interstate commerce, and 
matters that substantially affect interstate commerce.  E.g., Perez v. 
United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 
U.S. 1, 16-17 (2005).  Under Supreme Court precedent and the Consti-
tution’s text and history, the minimum coverage provision is a valid ex-
ercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.  
According to an extensive record of data compiled by Congress, the 
decision not to buy health insurance substantially affects interstate 
commerce.  See, e.g., Br. of U.S. at 10-11; 31-34.  This is true even under 
a narrow, economics-based understanding of “commerce.”  For example, 
in Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress, as part of 
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its regulation of interstate commerce in illegal drugs, could prohibit a 
person from growing marijuana in her own backyard for personal, me-
dicinal use (in a State where doing so was legal under local law).  Cer-
tainly if backyard, medicinal marijuana cultivation for personal use 
falls under Congress’s Commerce Clause power, Congress can regulate 
the decision to be uninsured when it comes to health care.   
Looking at Congress’s Commerce Clause power based on the text 
and history of the Constitution, Congress’s power to enact the minimum 
coverage provision is even clearer.  Under Resolution VI, the principle 
behind enumerated powers such as the Commerce Clause is to give 
Congress the ability “to legislate in all Cases for the general interests of 
the Union, and also in those to which the States are separately incom-
petent.”  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 131-
32.  Here, the spillover effects caused by individuals’ decisions to re-
main uninsured affect the nation as a whole.  See, e.g., Br. of U.S. at 10-
11; 31-39; 44-48.  Even if, like the lower court, this Court conceived of 
the decision to remain uninsured as a non-economic matter, this would 
be irrelevant: under the original meaning of the Commerce Clause, the 
real question is whether such a decision causes spillover effects, which 
Case: 11-1057     Document: 47-1      Date Filed: 03/07/2011      Page: 33
 27 
 
may themselves be economic in nature, creating a problem for more 
than a single state.  See Balkin, Commerce, at 44.  In addition, the min-
imum coverage provision addresses collective action problems in the 
States: there is the distinct possibility that “[p]eople with health prob-
lems will have incentives to move to a state where they cannot be 
turned down, raising health care costs for everyone, while insurers will 
prefer to do business in states where they can avoid more expensive pa-
tients with pre-existing conditions, and younger and healthier people 
may leave for jurisdictions where they can avoid paying for health in-
surance.”  Id. at 46.  The minimum coverage provision falls squarely 
within Congress’s ability to regulate “commerce” “for the general inter-
ests of the Union,” and also in those instances in “which the States are 
separately incompetent.”  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
OF 1787 at 131-32.   
B. Necessary & Proper Clause 
For the reasons discussed above, this Court can and should uphold 
the minimum coverage provision as a constitutional exercise of Con-
gress’s Commerce Clause authority.  However, the Court could also 
uphold the provision as a law that is “necessary and proper for carrying 
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into execution” 9 Congress’s power to regulate commerce among the sev-
eral States.  The Affordable Care Act is designed to make health care 
coverage affordable to all Americans and to prohibit certain insurance 
practices, such as the denial of coverage to individuals with pre-existing 
conditions.  See, e.g., Br. of U.S. at 13-15.  Among many other reasons, if 
Americans can go uninsured until they get sick and then impose these 
costs on those who already have health insurance policies, the ban on 
pre-existing conditions will be prohibitively expensive and the cost of 
insurance will increase across the board.  Id. at 41-48.  Congress deter-
mined that the minimum coverage provision was the appropriate means 
of regulating the health care and insurance markets.  Since the Act does 
not run afoul of any other constitutional provision—there is no constitu-
tional right to inflict uninsured health care costs on the American tax-
payers—health care reform falls squarely within Congress’s power to 
regulate commerce and enact necessary and proper legislation to carry 
out this power. 
The lower court rejected the Secretary’s necessary and proper ar-
gument based on a blatant misreading of the Necessary and Proper 
                                                          
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
Case: 11-1057     Document: 47-1      Date Filed: 03/07/2011      Page: 35
 29 
 
Clause.  The court stated that “[i]f a person’s decision not to purchase 
health insurance at a particular point in time does not constitute the 
type of economic activity subject to regulation under the Commerce 
Clause, then logically an attempt to enforce such provision under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause is equally offensive to the Constitution.”  
Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 779 (E.D. Va. 
2010).  This is neither logical nor correct.   
The court below appears to have read the Necessary and Proper 
Clause to allow only those means of execution that are absolutely indis-
pensable to the power being executed.  But this interpretation of the 
Clause was soundly rejected more than two hundred years ago.  McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413 (rejecting the argument 
that the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to pass only 
those laws “such as are indispensable, and without which the power 
would be nugatory”). See also id. at 406, 408 (explaining that the fra-
mers of the Constitution did not intend to impede the exercise of enu-
merated powers “by withholding a choice of means,” noting that, unlike 
the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution does not “require[] that 
everything granted shall be expressly and minutely described”).  As Al-
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exander Hamilton wrote to President Washington, the idea that the 
Clause allows only means of execution that are so necessary that with-
out them “the grant of the power would be nugatory,” is so potentially 
detrimental to constitutional government that “[i]t is essential to the be-
ing of the National Government that so erroneous a conception of the 
word necessary, shou’d be exploded.”  Letter from Alexander Hamilton 
to George Washington, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Es-
tablish a Bank, 1791 (emphasis in original).   “Necessary” in the Clause 
“means no more than needful, requisite, incidental, useful, or conducive 
to” the enumerated grant of power.  Id. (emphasis in original).  See also 
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (holding that 
the Necessary and Proper Clause affords Congress the power to use any 
“means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitu-
tionally enumerated power”).   
Moreover, requiring individuals to obtain or purchase particular 
items is not as unprecedented as some critics claim.  As Professor Adam 
Winkler has explained,10 just five years after the Constitution was 
                                                          
10 Adam Winkler, The Founders’ ‘Individual Mandate,’ available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-winkler/the-founding-fathers-
indi_b_523001.html. 
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drafted, in the second 1792 Militia Act,11 Congress required male citi-
zens to obtain certain weapons and other items, such as a “knapsack,” 
ammunition, and, in some cases, “a serviceable horse.”  This was a ne-
cessary and proper regulation to effectuate Congress’s power to raise 
armies.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (granting Congress power to “raise 
and support Armies”).  In the modern day case of health care, the indi-
vidual responsibility provision’s requirement to obtain health insurance 
if one can afford it is a necessary and proper regulation effectuating 
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. 
C. Principles of Federalism 
Given the lower court’s suggestion that this case in some way “im-
plicat[es] the Tenth Amendment,” 728 F. Supp. 2d at 771, it bears not-
ing that neither the Affordable Care Act generally, nor the minimum 
coverage provision specifically, infringes upon the reserved sovereignty 
of the States or principles of federalism.  States historically have been 
leaders in policy innovations that better protect their citizens, re-
sources, and environment.  See Exec. Order on Federalism No. 13132, 
64 Fed. Reg. 43255, § 2(e) (Aug. 4, 1999) (“States possess unique author-
                                                          
11 Text available at http://www.constitution.org/mil/mil_act_1792.htm. 
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ities, qualities, and abilities to meet the needs of the people and should 
function as laboratories of democracy.”).  The States have a long history 
of leadership on health care reform—indeed, the Affordable Care Act 
incorporated the valuable lessons learned from the experience of health 
care reform practices by state and local governments, and preserves the 
role of the States as laboratories of democracy by giving States consi-
derable policy flexibility.  The Affordable Care Act is appropriately res-
pectful of constitutional principles of vibrant federalism. 
For example, States have the discretion to form their own insur-
ance exchange or join with other States to form a regional exchange.  
See ACA § 1321, 42 U.S.C. 18041.  A State may also choose not to oper-
ate an exchange at all, in which case the federal government will admi-
nister a statewide insurance exchange for the benefit of the State’s citi-
zens.  Id. at § 1321(c).  While States must provide the opportunity to 
buy four levels of health care plans on the exchange—platinum, gold, 
silver, and bronze plans, at declining expense—they have significant 
discretion with respect to other aspects of the plans.  See ACA § 1331, 
42 U.S.C. 18051.  States can also set up their own programs—with or 
without an individual responsibility provision, or with a public option—
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under what has been called the Empowering States to Be Innovative 
provision.  ACA § 1332, 42 U.S.C. 18052.  States can obtain a waiver 
from the federal government if they set up a system that meets the cov-
erage and cost containment requirements in the Act.  Id.  The Afforda-
ble Care Act thus regulates health care to the extent necessary to solve 
the national problem, while allowing for the diversity and innovation 
that is the hallmark of the States.  See generally New State Ice Co. v. 
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (observ-
ing that, under our federalism, “a single courageous state may, if its cit-
izens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country”). 
* * * 
From the broad and substantial powers granted to Congress in the 
1787 Constitution, to the sweeping enforcement powers added to the 
Constitution through the amendment process in the last two centuries, 
our Constitution establishes a federal government that is strong enough 
to act when the national interest requires a national solution.   
Congress has the power to regulate the nearly 20 percent of the 
U.S. economy that is the health care industry, and, when faced with a 
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national health care crisis where millions are uninsured and cannot af-
ford decent health care, is empowered to act to reform the health care 
industry.  The Affordable Care Act’s minimum coverage provision fits 
within Congress’s Commerce Clause power and is also a necessary and 
proper means of effectuating Congress’s regulation of the health care 
industry.  Far from offending constitutional principles of federalism, the 
Act reflects how the federal and state governments can work together to 
protect their citizens and resources. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, amicus respectfully requests that, if the 
Court finds that the Commonwealth has standing, the Court reverse 
the ruling of the district court on the merits. 
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